Journal of Dispute Resolution
Volume 1994

Issue 1

Article 13

1994

Emergency Medical Treatment Statute: A Federal How to on
Avoiding Mandatory Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims Brooks v. Maryland Hospital, Inc., The
Karen E. Martin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Karen E. Martin, Emergency Medical Treatment Statute: A Federal How to on Avoiding Mandatory
Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims - Brooks v. Maryland Hospital, Inc., The, 1994 J. Disp. Resol.
(1994)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss1/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized editor
of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Martin: Martin: Emergency Medical Treatment Statute:

The Emergency Medical Treatment
Statute: A Federal "How To" on
Avoiding Mandatory Arbitration of
Medical Malpractice Claims
Brooks v. Maryland GeneralHospital,Inc.'

I. INTRODUCTION
The health care arena has been so invaded by claims of medical malpractice
that physicians, patients, and society as a whole are feeling the harmful side
effects. Medical malpractice claims affect doctors in the form of higher
malpractice insurance premiums. Patients are affected because they pay higher
medical costs and increased premiums, or worse, have no medical insurance
altogether. In addition, both doctors and patients are hurt by the practice of
defensive medicine and the decrease of creativity in treatment.
To combat the explosion of medical malpractice claims, some states have
made arbitration a mandatory prerequisite to filing medical malpractice suits.
These states hope that mandatory arbitration will decrease the number of claims
and lessen the impact of medical malpractice suits. The federal government has
created an obstacle to this effort in the form of the emergency medical treatment
statute. This federal statute regulates emergency room care, but courts have been
hesitant to call it a medical malpractice statute. As a result of the ambiguity in
the federal statute, claimants are able to avoid state-mandated arbitration, thereby
circumventing the goals of reducing the number of claims and lessening their
impact. This problem is illustrated in the case of Brooks v. Maryland General
Hospital, Inc. 2 This Note addresses the problem and offers solutions.
UI. FACTS AND HOLDING

On October 5, 1989, at 2:00 in the afternoon, Robert Brooks went to the
emergency room at Maryland General Hospital "complaining of acute weakness
and sudden inability to walk."3 He had no medical insurance. 4 Brooks was first

1.
2.
3.
4.

996 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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examined six hours later, but did not receive any treatment or evaluation.5 Over
three hours later, he was transferred to the University of Maryland Medical
System's emergency room.6 Three hours after the transfer, at approximately 3:15
the following morning, Brooks underwent a pan-myelogram and a CAT scan.7
Due to technical difficulties, the results of the CAT scan could not be read for

three more days.' As a result of Brooks' condition, he suffered serious damage
to his spinal cord.9

Brooks filed suit against both hospitals and several doctors alleging that "the
delay caused by the refusal of both hospitals and their professional personnel to
diagnose and stabilize his condition" resulted in permanent spinal cord damage,
requiring surgery and lengthy rehabilitation,'O Brooks' claim was filed in the
Federal District Court in Maryland under the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA)."
The defendant hospitals and doctors moved to dismiss Brooks' complaint for
failure to first arbitrate his claim as required by the Maryland Health Care
Malpractice Claims Act 2 (the Maryland Malpractice Act).'" The district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and held that Brooks' claim fell within
the Maryland Malpractice Act; that the EMTALA did not preempt this state law;

and therefore, that arbitration was required in this case. 4 Brooks appealed the
dismissal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 5
The Court of Appeals affimed the dismissal of the claims against the

individual physicians.1 6 However, the court reversed the dismissal of the claim
against both hospitals, holding that a claim brought under the EMTALA is not

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L No. 99-272, § 1921, 100
Stat. 164, 165-67 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. 1111991)). This
statute, enacted as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, requires all
hospitals which receive Medicare and have emergency rooms to screen every individual that comes into
the emergency room for emergency medical conditions and to stabilize any emergency medical
conditions found prior to release or transfer. See infra notes 19 - 69 and accompanying text.
MD. Cis. & JuD. PPoc. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1989). This statute requires a
12.
plaintiff to enter into nonbinding arbitration prior to fMling a claim for medical malpractice in
Maryland. See infra notes 70 - 100 and accompanying text.
13. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 709.
14. Id. at 709-10.
15. Id. at 710.
16. Id. at 710 n.2. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal because 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(d)(2XA) limits private civil actions brought under EMTALA to actions solely against hospitals.
This portion of the holding was not at issue in this case and will not be discussed in this Note.
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within the scope of the Maryland Malpractice Act, and therefore, need not be
arbitrated. 7

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND18

A. The Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act
Under early common law, hospitals were under no duty to treat any patient
and, further, did not have to justify their refusal.' 9 However, such a duty to
render emergency treatment exists in the common law of several states today.20
Moreover, these common law duty principles have been supplemented or replaced
in some states by statutes which require hospitals to render emergency care and/or
regulate transfers of emergency patients.2" The most all-inclusive regulations in
this area of health care came in 1986, when the United States Congress passed the

Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act as part of the
Consolidated Ommbus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).'
The EMTALA was enacted in response to the growing problem of "patient
'
Patient dumping is the practice by private hospitals of refusing to
dumping."24

treat emergency patients, who lack insurance or the ability to pay, by "dumping"
or transfening them to other public hospitals.2" Because of the rising costs of

17. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 710.
18. For clarification purposes, the Legal Background section of this Note will be divided into
two sections. The first section will discuss the history and interpretation of the federal emergency
medical treatment statute, and the second section will discuss the history and interpretation of
Maryland's malpractice statute. The Instant Decision section will discuss how the court combined
these legal histories to reach its decision.
19.
Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 157 So. 224, 225 (Ala. 1934); James P. McHugh,
Comment, Emergency Medical CareForIndigents: All HospitalsMust ProvideStabilizing Treatment
or Pay The Price, 93 W. VA. L REV. 165, 168 n.20 (1990) (citing several courts which uphold this
no-duty rule).
20. Andrew J.McClurg, Your Money Or Your Life: Interpretingthe FederalAct gainst Patient
Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 183 n.51 (1989) (citing cases from 14 states recognizing this
common law duty).
McClurg, supra note 20, at 190 n.84 (citing 26 states which impose these statutory
21.
regulations).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(i) (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
23. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 164(1986) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988
& Supp. in11991)).
Diane K. Falstrom, Conmment, Decisions Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and
24.
Active LaborAct: A JudicialCure ForPatientDumping,19 N. KY. L REV. 365, 365 (1992) (quoting
the REPORT OF THE HouSn ComimVE ON WAYS AND MEANS, RR. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579).
25.
See generally Karen L Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the
COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L REv. 1186 (1986).
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health care, the progressive role of hospitals as competitive businesses,26 and the
growing population of uninsured patients, 27 hospitals, which were previously

charitable organizations, have subsequently become financially-oriented, rather

than care-oriented.2"
Congress enacted the EMTALA to preserve and restore the tradition of
hospitals giving emergency medical aid to anyone in need, thus preventing
hospitals from dumping patients unable to pay for their care.29 As a result of the
EMTALA, when "any individual comes to the emergency department" and
requests examination or treatment for a medical condition, "the hospital must

provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of
the hospital's emergency department . . .to determine whether or not an
emergency medical condition exists."3 The hospital must utilize all "ancillary

services routinely available to the emergency department."'"
Two appellate courts3 2 defined "appropriate medical screening" as requiring
the hospital to provide similar examinations to all patients.33 Appropriateness is

determined "by reference to a hospital's standard screening procedures," not by
reference to the particular outcome of a particular patient."

The Fourth Circuit

attempted to further clarify this ambiguity in Baber v. Hospital Corp. of
America. 5 The Baber court held that the EMTALA was not a malpractice
statute, and that its purpose was not to ensure that all patients were diagnosed
correctly or even that they received adequate care. Rather, the purpose of the
EMTALA was to ensure that patients know that they will receive whatever

services a hospital can provide when they are truly in need.36

The requisite "appropriate medical screening" is used to determine if an

emergency medical condition exists. For purposes of the EMTALA, a patient
suffers an emergency medical condition if he or she is in imminent danger of
death or serious disability. 7 If no emergency medical condition exists, the

26. McClurg, supra note 20, at 179.
27. Danielle Lombardo Trostoriff, King Cobra Recoils, 37 FED. B. NEWs & J. 442, 443 (1990).
28. McClurg, supra note 20, at 179-80.
29. Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1132 (6th Cir. 1990).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
31. Id.
Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cleland v.
32.
Bronson Healthcare Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
33. Galewood, 933 F.2d at 1041; Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272.
34. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041.
35. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
36. Id.at 880.
Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1134. This section defines an "emergency medical condition' as:
37.
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
(including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in (i) placing the health of the individual in serious
jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any
bodily organ or part.
Id.(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(l)(A)).
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EMTALA does not apply. 8 If an emergency medical condition does exist, the
hospital must either provide the necessary stabilizing treatment"' or transfer the
patient to another medical facility, according to statutory guidelines.4
Stabilization requires "such medical treatment of the condition as may be
necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material
deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer
,,41 Once patients are stabilized, "COBRA no longer
of the individual ...
applies and hospitals are free to refuse further treatment or transfer patients for
purely economic reasons."42 Similarly, the hospital is under no further obligation
if a patient refuses treatment after being informed of the risks and benefits of the
examination and treatment, or if the patient consents to transfer prior to
stabilization.43
A transfer prior to stabilization is appropriate only after (1) the transferring
hospital "provides the medical treatment within its capacity which minimizes the
risks to the individual's health;" 44 and (2) the receiving hospital agrees to accept
the transfer and is willing and qualified to provide the necessary medical
treatment.45 In addition, if the patient, after being informed of the hospital's
obligations, requests a transfer in writing or the physician makes the proper
certification, a transfer will also be appropriate.46 For purposes of the EMTALA,
a "transfer" encompasses all movement outside of the hospital, including discharge,
at the direction of anyone associated with the hospital. 47 Therefore, the
EMTALA applies to both emergencyroom patients and inpatients who entered the
hospital with emergency medical conditions.48
49
The EMTALA can be enforced through penalties on participating hospitals

and physicians by the Federal Healthcare Financing Administration (HCFA), as
well as through private causes of action brought by harmed patients against

38. See generally Thornton, 895 F.2d 1131.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. 111 1991).
40. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B).
41. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).
42.
Robert A. Bitterman, A CriticalAnalysis of the FederalCOBRA Hospital 'Antidumping
Law": Ramificationsfor Hospitals, Physicians, and Effects on Access to Healthcare,70 U. DET.
MEtcY L. REV. 125, 146 (1992).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991.).
44. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A).
45. Id. § 1395dd(cX2)(B).
46. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1). This section provides that the doctor must certify that "the medical
benefits reasonably expected from the provision ofthe appropriate medical treatment at another medical
facility outweigh the increased risks to the individual... from effecting that transfer." Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
48. See Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1134.
49. "Participating hospital" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(eX2), which refers to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395cc. However, for purposes of this Note, a participating hospital is one that receives Medicare
payments and has an emergency department.
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participating hospitals.5 ° The EMTALA allows for "[a]ny individual who suffers
personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of a
requirement" to seek damages for personal injury and financial loss "under the law
of the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is
appropriate."'" As such, the statute does not directly provide for a private cause
of action against a physician.
These private causes of action against participating hospitals have forced
courts to interpret ambiguous portions of the EMTALA. Various courts have
interpreted the federal statute differently, resulting in problems. One of these
interpretation problems arises in determining who may bring an action under this
statute. In the past, courts relied on legislative intent that the statute was to
prevent the withholding of treatment to indigent patients.52 These courts held
that a cause of action must include an allegation that the hospital's refusal of
treatment was for economic reasons.53 Later courts rejected this argument and
relied solely on the language in the statute itself.54 These courts interpreted the
EMTALA as providing protection for all patients and rejected any previous
56
limitations on its coverage." The court in Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp.
held that the language of the act did not "set forth any specific economic status
criteria" limiting the type of individual covered by EMTALA, and that the court
"need not resort to the statute's legislative history" for its interpretation." One
court has implied that discrimination based upon race or religious belief could
constitute a basis for an EMTALA claim." Therefore, as the law presently
stands, any person, regardless of his or her economic situation, may bring a federal
EMTALA claim.
A second issue facing courts interpreting the EMTALA is whether it
preempts state malpractice law. The EMTALA specifically states that its
provisions "do not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent
that the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of [the EMTALA." 59

50. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(l)-(2) (1988 & Supp. 1111991). Although there are several different
penalties imposed by the HCFA, this Note will focus on the availability of private causes of action
discussed in Section 1395dd(d)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. II 1991).
51.
52. See Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1132; Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 435 (D. Kan. 1990);
Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 721 F. Supp. 495, 497 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Nichols v. Estabrook, 741
F. Supp. 325, 329 (D.N.H. 1989).
53. Stewart, 731 F. Supp. at 434-35; EviII, 727 F. Supp. at 498; Nichols, 741 F. Supp. at 330.
54. See Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1040; Cleland, 917 F.2d at 267; Burrows v. Turner Memorial
Hosp., 762 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Delaney v. Cade, 756 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Kan. 1991);
Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
55. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1040; Cleland, 917 F.2d at 267, Burrows, 762 F. Supp. at 842;
Delaney, 756 F. Supp. at 1486; Deberry, 741 F. Supp. at 1306.
56. 947 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 414.
58. Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89 CIV. 0300(CSH), 1989 WL 146265 (S.DN.Y. Nov. 21, 1989)
(memorandum opinion and order).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991).
59.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss1/13

6

1994]

Martin: Martin: Emergency Medical Treatment Statute:
Emergency Medical TreatmentStatute

A primary case addressing the application of state law to EMTALA claims is an
Indiana federal court's decision in Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical
Hospital,Inc.' Indiana medical malpractice claims are statutorily limited in two
ways: (1) caps on damages; 61 and (2) mandatory review panels prior to filing a
claim.62 The Reid court held that because damage caps were substantive in
nature, and did not directly conflict with any provisions of EMTALA, they could
be applied.63 However, the court held that the review panel requirement was
procedural, and in direct conflict with the EMTALA's provisions allowing an
immediate cause of action "whenever'[a]ny individual... suffers personal harm
as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement of [Section
1395dd(d)(3)(A)]."'6 4 Thus, the Reid court ruled that the EMTALA did not
incorporate the procedural limitation of mandatory medical panel review. 65
Several other courts have followed Reid in adopting only state substantive
law,' despite the fact that the provisions of the EMTALA do not mention or
differentiate between the preemption of state substantive or procedural laws.67
However, this rule is not controlling in all federal courts.' Conversely, the First
Circuit has supported a state-mandated medical review panel of federal causes of
action stating, in dicta, that "[d]octors and hospitals, and, ultimately, their other
patients, need screening protection against frivolous claims as much under the
69
federal statute as they do for other malpractice charges."

60. 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
61. Id. at 854.
62. Id.
63. Id at 855-56.
64. Id.at 855 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(dX3XA) (1988)).
65. Id. at 855-56.
66. See, e.g., Green v. Touro Infurmary, Civ. A. No. 90-4860, 1991 WL 17259, at *1 (E.D. La.
Feb. 4, 1991) (citing Reid,review by a medical panel was not required because of the direct conflict
with federal statute); Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Tex. 1990)
(allowing claim for emotional distress because such claims are allowed under state medical malpractice
law); Maziarka v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., No. 88 C 6658, 1989 WL 13195, at *2 (N.D. II Feb. 16, 1989)
(holding by memorandum opinion and order that no punitive damages were allowed in federal
EMTALA claim because they were not allowed under state medical malpractice law); Fastrom, supra
note 24, at 381-83.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) provides that "the provisions of this section do not preempt any State
or local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement
of this section." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (emphasis added).
68. See Power v. Arlington Hosp., 800 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D. Va. 1992).
69. Wilson v. Atlanticare Medical Ctr., 868 F.2d 34, 35 (1st Cir. 1989) (The court did not reach
the merits of the case because it was dismissed for procedural reasons. Therefore, the court's support
of this proposition is only in the form of dictum).
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B. Maryland'sHealth Care
Malpractice Claims Statute
Maryland's Malpractice Act7" was enacted in 1976 in the face of a medical
malpractice crisis and was designed "to counteract rapidly rising insurance rates
and to ensure adequate coverage for medical personnel and facilities." 7' The
legislature's purpose was to "reduce the number of medical malpractice court suits
by screening out frivolous claims at the arbitration level. 72 This legislative act
requires that individuals with medical malpractice claims attempt to resolve their
disputes before an arbitration panel as a prerequisite to formal court action."
The goals of this condition precedent to litigation are: (1) to level off the rising
cost of health care due to "exorbitant" malpractice insurance premiums; (2)to curb
the practice of defensive medicine by lawsuit-fearful doctors; and (3) to restore
faith in the traditional tort system as it relates to medical malpractice claims.74
The statute, in effect, augments the existing structure of tort claim resolution
by adding a procedural layer of arbitration to all medical injury claims. 75 Any
medical malpractice claim "by a person against a health care provider, 7 6 for any
sum greater than $5,000," must be filed with the Director of the Health Claims
Arbitration Office. 78 All claims must include a certificate from a qualified expert
attesting to a departure from the standard of care which is the proximate cause of
the alleged injury. 79 The Director then forwards a copy of the claim to each
health care provider involved, and the procedure is underway. 0 At any time
prior to the Health Claims Arbitration Office hearing, parties may mutually agree
to waive arbitration."

70. MD. CTs. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1989).
71.
Matthew Zimmerman, The Constitutionalityof Medical MalpracticeMediationPanels: A
MarylandPerspective, 9 BALT. L REV. 75, 75 (1979).
72. Newell v. Richards, 594 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Md. 1991). See also Wyndham v. Haines, 503
A.2d 719, 721-22 (Md. 1986); Attorney General v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 59 (Md. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978), overruledby Newell, 594 A.2d 1152.
73. Johnson, 385 A.2d at 59.
74. Kevin G. Quinn, The Health CareMalpractice Claims Statute: Maryland'sResponse To
The Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 BALT. L. REV. 74, 74-75 (1980).
75. Id at 81.
76.
The statute defines "health care provider" to include hospitals or related institutions,
physicians, osteopaths, optometrists, chiropractors, registered or licensed practical nurses, dentists,
podiatrists, psychologists, licensed certified social workers-clinical, or physical therapists. MD. Cis.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-01(c) (1989 & Supp. 1993).
77. MD. C . & Sun. Pxoc. CODD Al-N. § 3-2A-02(a) (19g9).
78. Id. § 3-2A-04(a). As stated in Section 3-2A-03(a), the Health Claims Arbitration Office is
a unit of the Executive Department, and the Director is "appointed by the Governor with the advice
and consent of the Senate." Id. § 3-2A-03(a).
79. Id § 3-2A-04(b)(1).
80. Id. § 3-2A-04(a).
81. Id. § 3-2A-06A(a).
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The Director has a prepared list comprised of three categories of qualified
persons willing to serve as arbitrators.82 The list contains the names of attorneys,
individuals who are health care providers, and persons from the general public

who are neither attorneys, health care providers, or agents or employees of an
The Director delivers to each party the names and
insurance company.'
biographical information of six persons from each category to be possible
panelists.s Each party then strikes the names of any unacceptable panelists and
returns the list to the Director."5 The Director compares these lists and selects

mutually agreeable person in each category to comprise the arbitration
the first
86
panel.

After some discovery and other procedural matters, the panel rules on all
issues of law' and fact' and determines if the health care provider is liable to
the claimant.89 If liability is found, the panel then determines the extent of

"appropriate damages."'

The arbitration panel may award compensatory and

nominal damages, as well as punitive damages. 91

Neither party is bound to accept the award, and it may be rejected for any
reason within thirty days.' If neither party rejects the award, it becomes final
and binding, and is filed with the appropriate circuit court, resulting in a final
judgment. 93 If a party is displeased and desires to nullify the award, that party

may do so by filing an action in court and filing a copy of that action with the
Director."n An award may be vacated on the grounds of corruption, fraud,
partiality, or the like.95 If it96is not vacated, it is admissible as evidence at trial
and presumed to be correct.

82. Id. § 3-2A-03(c).
83. Id. § 3-2A-03(cX2).
84. Id. § 3-2A-04(c).
85. Id. § 3-2A-04(d).
86. Id. § 3-2A-04(e).
87. Id. § 3-2A-05(a) (Issues of law and prehearing procedure are determined by the attorney
member of the panel, who serves as the panel chairperson). Id. § 3-2A-05(c).
88. MD. Cis. & JUD.Paoc. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(a) (1989) (Issues of fact are decided by the
panel as a whole).
89. Id. § 3-2A-05(e).
90. Id.
91. Bishop v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, 410 A.2d 630, 632 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
92. MD.Cis. & JuD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(a) (1989).
93. Id. § 3-2A-05(i).
94. Id. § 3-2A-06(b).
95. Id.§ 3-2A-06(c) (citing MD. CT. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 3-224(b)(l)-(4)).
96. Id. § 3-2A-06(d). Courts have held that if the claimant is successful at the arbitration level,
and the health care provider is the party seeking to set aside the award, the "arbitration award in favor
of [the] claimant is admissible and presumed correct, but it does not shift the common law burden of
proof to the health care provider." Newell, 594 A.2d at 1160. Thus, the claimant remains as the
plaintiff in the action and retains the burden of proof as to the fatfimder, the health care provider's
burden of proof under the statute relates only to the award as a specific item of evidence to be
rebutted. See Newell, 594 A.2d at 1158-69 for extensive instruction on this shift of the burden.
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The final section of the Maryland Malpractice Act provides that "[t]he
provisions of this subtitle shall be deemed procedural in nature and shall not be
construed to create, enlarge, or diminish any cause of action not heretofore
existing."'
A federal court interpreted this provision in Davison v. Sinai
Hospital of Baltimore.9" The Davison court interpreted this "Construction of

Subtitle" section of the EMTALA as indicating the intent of the legislature to not
create a new cause of action with this statute." Further, the Davison court held
that the Maryland Malpractice Act was substantive in nature, and therefore, under
the Erie doctrine, must be applied by federal courts as the substantive law of
Maryland10
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION

In the case at bar, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the question
of "whether a plaintiff seeking relief under EMTALA must first pursue arbitration
required by state law for medical malpractice claims."'01 This was a question
of first impression for this court."" The Brooks court chose to analyze this issue
by answering two questions:'0 3 (1) whether the EMTALA claim fell within the

Maryland Malpractice Act; t°' and (2) whether the EMTALA incorporates or
preempts the terms of Maryland's Malpractice Act.' 5 The court decided that
Brooks' EMTALA claim did not fall within the terms of Maryland's Malpractice
Act, 0 6 but refrained from ruling on whether the state law requirement applied
in a suit based on federal question jurisdiction." 7 In reaching its decision, the
Brooks court discussed: (1) the effects and interpretation of the EMTALA; (2) the
effects and interpretation of the Maryland Malpractice Act; and (3)the application
of the EMTALA to the Maryland Malpractice Act."s

97. MD. CTS. & JUD. Pnoc. CoDE ANN. § 3-2A-09 (1989).
98. 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978), affd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). Davison was a federal
suit based on diversity jurisdiction. Idt at 779.
99. Ida at 780.
100. Id.
101. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 710.
102.
Id.
103. Id. at 713.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.

107.

Id. at 711.

108.

See generally Brooks, 996 F.2d at 710-15.
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A. The Effects and Interpretationof the EMTALA
In analyzing the EMTALA and its implications, the court in Brooks first
discussed the Congressional intent of the statute and its original application.' 0 9
The court summarized the two duties which the EMTALA places on the hospitals
which receive Medicare and have emergency rooms. First, there is the duty "to
provide to anyone presented for treatment 'an appropriate medical screening...
to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition... exists,"' and
second, the duty "to stabilize the condition or, if medically warranted, to transfer
the person to another facility if the benefits of transfer outweigh its risks."'"3
The Brooks court then defined how a person may recover from a breach of these
duties under applicable state law,"' briefly discussed the means for the proper
transfer of a patient under the EMTALA, 2and focused on the applicable standard
of care in an EMTALA cause of action."
3
The court reiterated its holding in Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America"
that the EMTALA is not a malpractice statute because its purpose is not to
guarantee proper diagnosis or even ensure adequate care. 4 As such, the Brooks
court stated that the hospital's duty of appropriate screening and stabilization is
measured "by reference to a hospital's standard screening procedures.""' 5 In
other words, the standard of care by which the hospital is measured is simply
whether it applied the same screening procedures to all patients uniformly.
B. Effects and Interpretationof the Maryland
Malpractice Act
The Brooks court next interpreted Maryland's Malpractice Act to determine
whether it applied to the instant cause of action. The court described the
underlying goals of the malpractice statute as "facilitat[ing] access to insurance by
health care providers and... lessen[ing] the cost of health care."" 6 The court
summarized the Act as requiring nonbinding arbitration as a condition precedent
to filing a medical malpractice claim."1 The Brooks court stated that the
purpose of this condition precedent is to screen out frivolous claims, thereby
lowering the number of medical malpractice suits that reach trial." 8 The court
explored specific provisions of the Act, such as to whom it applies, who qualifies

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Brooks, 996 F.2d at 711.
Id. at 710 (quoting EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991)).
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
Id. at710-11.
977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
Brooks, 996 F.2d at 711 (citing Baber, 977 F.2d at 880).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 712 (citing Newell, 594 A.2d at 1159).
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as a "health care provider," and what constitutes a "medical injury." 9 Further,
the court explained the following: (1) the requirement of an expert attestation for
the departure from the standard of care; 20 (2) the composition of the arbitration
panel; 121 (3) the role of the panel in determining liability and assessing
damages; 22 and (4) the parties' options following the panel decision."
Finally, the Brooks court emphasized the final section of the Act, which provides
that the Maryland Malpractice Act "shall be deemedprocedural in nature and shall
not . . . 24create, enlarge, or diminish any cause of action not heretofore

existing."1
The Brooks court concluded that the application of Maryland's Malpractice
Act has been limited. The court has applied the Act "to traditional malpractice
claims arising from the breach by a professional of his duty to comply with a
standard of care."' 25 The court cited examples of "[c]laims for injuries arising
from other causes in connection with health care" which were not covered by the
act.

1 26

The court noted a final limitation to the applicability of the Maryland
Malpractice Act. A health care provider is liable only if the care given "is not in
accordance with the standards of practice among members of the same health care
situated in the same or similar
profession with similar training and experience
27
communities at the time of the alleged act."
C. Application of the EA4TALA on the Maryland
MalpracticeAct
In the third phase of its decision, the Brooks court, using its discussion of the
two statutes, answered its original questions of whether Brooks' claim is covered
by the EMTALA, and if so, whether the EMTALA should apply the state law
Although it appears, at first glance, that an
procedural requirement. 22
EMTALA claim would fall under the Maryland Malpractice Act, the court held

119. Id. (citing MD. Cis. & IUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01(e)-(), 3-2A-02 (1989)).
120. Id. (citing MD. CIS. & JUD, PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(b)(1) (1989)).
121. Id. (citing MD. Cis. & JUD, PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04 (1989)).
122. Id. (citing MD. Cis. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(g) (1989)).
123. Id. (citing MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06 (1989)).
124. Id. (citing MD. CTS. & JUD, PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-09 (1989)).
125. Id. (citing Cannon v. McKen, 459 A.2d 196, 201 (Md. 1983)).
126. Id. For example, in Cannon, where a patient was allegedly injured when a piece of dental
equipment fell from the wall and injured her, a claim against the dentist was not covered by the Act
as malpractice. Canon, 459 A.2d at 202. In addition, the court in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Doe, 556
A.2d 1107 (Md. 1989) held that the Maryland Malpractice Act did not apply to a claim against the Red
Cross by a recipient of HIV-infected blood for "failure to adopt proper testing and screening
procedures." Id. at 1125.
Brooks, 996 F.2d at 713 (citing MD. Cm. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02(c),
127.
amended by 1993 MD. LAWS 9, §1).
128. Id
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that Brooks' claim did not fall under the Act. ' 29 First, Maryland's Malpractice
Act has been limited in its application to traditional malpractice claims; 3 ' and
second, Brooks' right of recovery under his EMTALA claim is limited to the
hospital's breach of the EMTALA duties.' 31 Therefore, the Brooks court, in
answering the first question presented, held that because Brooks' claim is one of
"disparate screening," which is a breach of a hospital's duty under the EMTALA,
standard of care duty, the Maryland
rather than a breach of a traditional
3
Malpractice Act did not apply.1 1
The Brooks court considered, but refrained from ruling on, how the
EMTALA is affected by state law. 33 The district court in Brooks dismissed
Brooks' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the holding in
The Rowland court held that state-mandated
Rowland v. Patterson.134
arbitration did not conflict with the requirements of EMTALA.135 Instead, it
was a "condition precedent to legal action," which had substantive aspects, and
therefore, must be honored by federal courts. 36 However, the Fourth Circuit
disagreed with the district court and distinguished Brooks from Rowland, finding
that Rowland was brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, while
Brooks' claim is one of federal question. 137 Therefore, since Brooks' claim was
brought as a federal question, the Rowland decision is not binding. Further, the
Brooks court stated that in determining how state law affects the EMTALA,
it
3
must "decide the nature and scope of [the] federal cause of action."
Accordingly, the Brooks court assessed the key to solving this dilemma as
being whether the EMTALA explicitly or impliedly incorporates state law.' 3 9

In considering this, the court looked to the statute itself. First, the court stated
that Congress' intent in passing the EMTALA was to fill the gaps in state
malpractice law and impose limited duty. 40 Second, the court recognized the
limited preemption of the EMTALA as being only to the extent that a state or
4
local requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of the EMTALA.1 1

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 714.
134. 882 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1989) (a medical malpractice claim brought in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction must employ state-mandated arbitration because it is a substantive issue).
135.
Id at 99.
136. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 714 (citing Rowland, 882 F.2d at 99).
137. Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id. The court reached this point after explaining that, in a federal cause of action,
substantive state limitations will be given effect in interpreting federal statutes only "if Congress has
evinced an intention to give state law persuasive or binding effect." Id. (quoting Reconstruction
Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1946)).
140. Id at 714-15.
141. Id. at 715 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (1988 & Supp. 111990)).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

13

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1994, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 13
[Vol. 1994, No. I
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Finally, the Brooks court suggested that the EMTALA expressly adopts state-

imposed limitations on damages by providing for recovery of "those damages
available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is
located. '142 From this analysis, the Brooks court proposed a possible argument
that state-mandated arbitration comes within "a broader penumbra of the
intent to weave EMTALA duties into the fabric of state malpractice
Congressional
3
14

law."

However, the Fourth Circuit refrained from ruling on whether the EMTALA
incorporates or implicitly tolerates state-mandated arbitration procedures. Finally,

the court held that regardless of whether the EMTALA incorporates or tolerates
claim does not fall
the Maryland Malpractice Act requirement, Brooks' EMTALA
44
within the Act, and therefore, need not be arbitrated.1
V. COMMENT
While the decision in Brooks that an EMTALA claim does not fall within the
Maryland Malpractice Act is understandable, and the court was correct in its legal
analysis, the issues involved are certainly not as black and white as the court
seems to believe. In fact, further examination of the surrounding law and policies
involved supports an argument that this EMTALA claim should be treated as
medical malpractice for the purpose of state-mandated arbitration.
First, it is arguable that the EMTALA has become a federal malpractice
statute in its practical application. In fact, some would say that "COBRA has
really been a federal malpractice law all along."' 45 The Brooks court is adamant
about what it perceives as an "obvious" differencebetweenthe EMTALA and state

medical malpractice. 146

However, the distinct lines which separated these

entities have faded to some extent. The most notable neutralization of this
distinction involves the concept of a hospital's duty under the federal statute.
Specifically, the answersto such questions as to whom "hisduty is owed, and what
this duty consists of, lend themselves to the argument that the EMTALA is indeed
a medical malpractice statute. 47

142. Id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2XA) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
143.
Id The court further explained the necessity of inquiring whether mandatory arbitration
was inconsistent with other portions of the EMTALA. In doing so, it would be confronted with such
questions as: (1) whether the expert attestation under the Maryland Malpractice Act conflicts with the
proof required under EMTALA; (2) whether the presumption of correctness of the arbitration award
conflicts with the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (3) whether state arbitration requirements have an
adverse effect on EMTALA's statute of limitations. Id.
144. Id
145. Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Son of COBRA: The Evolution ofa FederalMalpractice Law,
45 STAN. L REv. 263, 264 (1992).
146. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 711.
147. Metropoulos, supra note 145, at 270-78 (extensively discussing this evolution into federal
malpractice).
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As discussed initially, the purpose of this statute was to prevent patient
dumping. 48 However, as time has passed since its enactment, this purpose has
fallen by the wayside. Courts have chosen to interpret the EMTALA according
to the plain meaning of its words, rather than its legislative history. 49 As a
result, the duties of this federal statute apply to "any and all" emergency room
patients, not just those who are indigent or uninsured. 5 ° Due to this expansion,
hospitals and physicians are exposed to a considerably greater amount of liability
than originally anticipated under this statute.
Further, the question of the duty owed under the EMTALA has undergone
revision and interpretation, and lends support to the argument that the EMTALA
is a medical malpractice statute, not just a procedural statute. While the standard
of care, interpreted by the Brooks court as requiring uniform screening procedures
for every patient, appears to be completely subjective, it has several analogous
elements of the objective standard of care required in state medical malpractice
claims.
In traditional medical malpractice claims, a breach of duty is measured with
an objective standard, comparing the actions of a physician or hospital with those
This reasonableness
of a reasonable medical person under the circumstances.'
For purposes of
is proven by the requirement of expert medical testimony.'
this analysis, the standard of duty required under the EMTALA will be divided
by the statute: (1) screening; (2) stabilization;
into the three obligations provided
15 3
and (3) transfer or discharge.
First, the EMTALA requires that the hospital must provide "an appropriate
medical screening examination within the capabilities of [its] emergency
department."' 54 This duty is subjective and has been interpreted as requiring the
same screening offered to any paying patient.'55 Second, the EMTALA requires
stabilization to prevent material deterioration with reasonable medical
probability. 5 6 This stabilization is to be determined by outside expert testimony
concerning the treatment given" 7 and asks whether the medical treatment was
"reasonable under the circumstances."'5 8 Finally, prior to transfer, a doctor must
perform a risk-benefit analysis weighing "the medicalbenefits reasonably expected

148. See Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1132-33.
149. See, e.g., Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992); Brooker v. Desert
Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1040.
Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268-70.
150.
See Hahn v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 461 A.2d 7, 13 (1983).
151.
152. Id.
153. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
154.
155. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4) (1988).
157. Burditt v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1369 (5th Cir.
1991).
158. Lee by Wetzel v. Alleghany Regional Hosp. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 900, 903 (W.D. Va. 1991)
(quoting Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Ml1.1990)).
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from the provision of appropriate medical treatment at another medical facility"
with the increased risks of transfer.' 59 This analysis is similar to the cost-benefit
analysis performed in tort cases concerning reasonable care."6 The objective
elements involved in determining a breach of these duties, coupled with the
expansion of the availability of EMTALA claims to all patients, undermines the
Brooks court's continued holding that the EMTALA is definitely not a federal
malpractice statute.
Next, according to the Brooks interpretation of the statute, it would seem that
there is minimal preemption of state or local law by the EMTALA."6' For the
EMTALA to preempt state law, either substantive or procedural, the state law
must be in direct conflict with a requirement of the EMTALA.' 62 Application
of this preemption provision, and interpretations of how to apply state law, have
revealed several inconsistencies. First, there are other state medical malpractice
limitations which are imposed on EMTALA claims. Specifically, both state law
damage caps 63 and state prohibitions of punitive damages have been
incorporated." 64 In addition, a claim for severe mental anguish, as defined by
state substantive law, was allowed as a "personal injury" in an EMTALA
"
claim. 65
'
The preemption provision of the federal statute makes no
differentiation between state substantive and state procedural law. In fact, certain
procedural requirements, such as state statutory notice requirements, have been
held not to be in direct conflict with, and therefore remain in effect during, claims
under the EMTALA.' 6 However, to respond to the argument that only state
substantive law should be incorporated, a federal district court in Davison v. Sinai
Hospital of Baltimore67 found the Maryland Malpractice Act to be substantive
in nature.

168

This discussion leaves two unanswered questions: (1) If this is not a medical
malpractice statute, why are certain medical malpracticelimitations being applied?;
and (2) Is the conflict between the EMTALA and the Maryland Malpractice Act
really as direct as the court would have us believe? The courts have never
addressed these questions. It is inherently inconsistent for the court to go out of
its way to keep the EMTALA from being called a medical malpractice statute,
while, at the same time, it applies certain state medical malpractice limitations.

159. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
160. See Metropoulos, supra note 145, at 276, for a discussion of Learned Hand's cost-benefit
analysis of reasonable care as found in United States v. Carrol Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947).
161. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 715.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (1988).
163. Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855-56.
164. Mcaiarka, 1989 WL 13195 at*2.
165.
Owens, 741 F. Supp. at 1280.
166. Draper v.Chiapuzio, 755 F. Supp. 331, 333 (D.Or. 1991).
167. 462 F. Supp. 778 (D.Md. 1978) (this
analysis was made for Erie purposes ina case of
diversity jurisdiction).
168. 'Id. at780.
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Further, state-mandated arbitration does not terminate or prohibit any means of

civil enforcement found in the EMTALA. It merely postpones litigation for
important policy reasons. Therefore, the Maryland Malpractice Act is not in
"direct conflict" with the federal statute. This "federal preemption provision may
single-handedly dismantle state malpractice tort reforms that have been enacted
over the last two decades."1 69
Finally, where required by state law, EMTALA claims should be arbitrated
simply because the policy considerations favoring arbitration in these cases are the
same as those supporting arbitration of state malpractice claims. There is just as
great a need to prevent frivolous EMTALA claims as there is to prevent frivolous
state statute-based malpractice claims. One court stated that "[dioctors and
hospitals, and ultimately, their other patients, need screening protection against
frivolous claims as much under the federal statute as they'do for other malpractice
charges."' 0 The same damage to a physician or hospital occurs in the form of
expensive litigation costs, increased malpractice insurance costs, and possible
extensive damage to reputation, regardless of whether it involves a frivolous
EMTALA claim or a medical malpractice claim. This, in turn, affects the policy
regarding the need to reduce health care costs by reducing health care insurance
costs. Finally, mandatory arbitration reduces the need for doctors and hospitals
to increasingly practice defensive medicine or act conservatively in their treatment
out of fear of litigious patients. If arbitration of EMTALA claims can prevent
frivolous claims, reduce insurance and health care costs, and improve health care
by lessening the need for doctors to practice defensive medicine, then by all
means, these claims should go to arbitration.

VI. CONCLUSION
Even though courts have succeeded in finding differences in the make-up of
traditional medical malpractice statutes and the EMTALA, the results and effects
of claims stemming from either are the same and are dangerous. The United
States is presently seeking to overhaul a troubled health care system. Providing
individuals with a means to bring suit against health care providers, while sidestepping the drawbacks of traditional suits, will open the door to more numerous
and larger medical malpractice claims. Courts should stop putting forth an effort
to create "obvious" distinctions, where they do not exist, and instead, send all
medical malpractice claims to arbitration.
KAREN E. MARTIN

169.
170.

Bitterman, supra note 42, at 179.
Wilson v. Atlanticare Medical Ctr., 868 F.2d 34, 35 (1st Cir. 1989).
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